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Abstract
This paper examines the EU behaviour at the United Nations General As-
sembly (plenary session plus the six committees) during the 64th session.
The analysis, based on an extensive review of voting behaviour, statements,
and meetings PV, focuses on external perceptions of EU. If the EU appears
clearly as a united group at the UNGA, this cohesiveness does not lead to
more influence as far as ideas and values are concerned.
Key-words: European Union, United nations General Assembly, voting
behaviour, statements, perceptions
Résumé
Cet article examine le comportement de l’UE à l’assemblée Générale des
Nations Unies (session plénière plus les six comités) pendant la 64e session.
Basée sur une analyse exhaustive des comportements de vote, des discours et
des comptes-rendus de réunions, cette analyse examine la façon dont l’UE est
perçue. Si l’UE apparaît clairement comme un groupe soudé, cette cohésion
n’implique pas une plus grande influence en ce qui concerne les idées et les
valeurs.
Mots clés : Union européenne, Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, com-
portement de vote, déclarations, perceptions
Cover: snapshot of the http://www.eu-un.europa.eu homepage.
Introduction
The initial goal of this study was to detect the flux of political ideas within
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in order to better under-
stand what the external perceptions of the EU on the international stage
were. This project however does not follow the approach usually undertaken
in this field since it is not based on a quantitative methodology enabling a
calculation to be made of the cohesion of the EU and the distance that sepa-
rates it from other groups of countries. It should not therefore be compared
to the analyses produced by these methods and for this specific purpose1.
Moreover, this study does not aim to test grand models of International
Relations regarding the voting patterns of states2 or to relate a grand narra-
tive about the relationship between both international organisations and the
proper role of the EU. Many surveys have already analysed the votes at the
UN and drawn conclusions regarding the growing convergence between EU
Member states3. Other works are based on interviews with diplomats based
in Geneva and New York. A growing number of collective projects gathering
together prominent scholars in European Studies have published lengthy and
compelling articles dedicated to the issue of perceptions and ‘actorness’ in
respect of the EU as a global actor. Therefore, and in order not to duplicate
work already done, we decided to take some of the main conclusions of the
existing studies as starting points and to elaborate our own path.
Before embarking on our own contribution it is worth highlighting some
of main findings previously produced on our topic:
• The number of occurrences of ‘European Union’ activity is growing
in official UN documents, however, around 90% of the total can be
explained by the fact that someone is speaking on behalf of the EU.
In other cases, the EU is mentioned because it is participating in the
Quartet (with Russia, the USA and the UN) in charge of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict; while only 5% of the references to the EU concern
specific EU policies - or the EU as an actor per se4.
• The UN discourse on the EU highlights the fact that both organisa-
tions share the same values and norms (in particular the promotion
of democracy and multilateralism, Human Rights and the rule of law,
1See, Laurent Beauguitte, L’Assemblée générale de l’ONU de 1985 à nos jours, L’Espace
géographique, 2010-3, pp.276-282.
2See for instance the work done by James H. Lebovic and Erik Voeten, The Politics of
Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in UNHCR, International
Studies Quarterly, 2006, 50(4), pp.861-888.
3See for instance, Paul Luif, EU cohesion in the UN General Assembly, ISS Occasional
Papers n.49, December 2003.
4Franziska Brantner, The EU through the eyes of the United Nations, in S. Lucarelli
and L. Fioramonti (eds.), External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor,
London/New York, Routledge, 2010, pp.165-179.
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sustainable development and the eradication of poverty, etc.). This
so-called ‘natural convergence’ leads the UN to consider the EU as
a ‘natural partner’ inasmuch as the UN is fostering the development
of deeper relationships with regional organisations5. The ‘privileged’
position of the EU is also a consequence of the importance of its fi-
nancial contribution to the UN. Indeed, some 38% of the UN budget
is funded by the EU. But, at the same time, UN officials are convinced
that only the UN can provide universal legitimacy to EU actions at
the global level. Therefore, this partnership is embedded in a contract
based ‘an exchange of resources’. The proper ambition of the EU in the
field of peacekeeping, environmental protection, and the fight against
poverty is acknowledged. On social and economic issues, support is
more nuanced insofar as the trade policy of the EU has been regularly
criticised.
• Interviews with representatives of third states reveal a set of contrast-
ing pictures. If the EU is generally portrayed as a global actor, the
assessment of its policies depends ultimately on the field considered.
Thus, on security matters, the EU is not viewed as a fully-fledged actor,
capable of defending its own interests, especially not for those handled
by the Security Council. Against this backdrop, only France and the
UK are seen as relevant actors. The EU’s presence and relevance is
more fully acknowledged in terms of economic and social matters (de-
velopment policy, cooperation, the promotion of human rights, and the
fight against impunity 6). In this context, the image of the EU is that
of a powerful actor capable of acting strategically to defend its own in-
terests. As a result, however, the EU has increasingly become an object
of criticism from countries pinpointing the often-patronising nature of
its policies, its seeming arrogance and its prosthelytizing nature. Most
of the time, such criticism is linked to the history of colonialism or is
made in reference to its belonging to ‘Western civilisation’. This re-
minds us that the North-South divide is - rhetorically at least - very
much alive.
• Nonetheless, there are people who think that the EU is a meaning-
ful political actor that could play the role of ‘bridge builder’ between
different groups within the UN and notably between the US and the
G777.
5Ibid., p.168.
6Ibid., p.171. The fight against impunity pertains to violations of fundamental human
rights and the work of the International Penal Court.
7It is notably the case for the States participating in the CANZ group gathering Aus-
tralia, Canada, New Zeeland, Fiona Creed, Global Perceptions of the European Union at
the United Nations, Studia Diplomatica, LIX(4), 2006, pp.5-18.
4
• Be it within the General Assembly or special committees, potential
partners for the EU tend to consider that this important role is jeop-
ardised by the increasing difficulty and randomness of coordination
among EU member states. Indeed, since much of the time is dedicated
to finding a consensus within the EU for the sake of ‘speaking with
one voice’, there is often little time left for cooperation with external
players. As a consequence, the EU is often seen as ‘inflexible’ and
as a difficult partner when it attempts to influence the outcomes of a
vote or to gather together more positive votes on its draft resolutions8.
Regrettably this perception is only confirmed when EU proposals are
presented as ‘take-it or leave-it’ offers allowing no room for negotia-
tion9. This lack of flexibility and is inherently linked to its internal
bureaucratic organisation and to the necessity to ‘speak with one voice
’ which remains the sine qua non of EU external policy10.
There is then a gap, sometimes a significant one, between the way the
EU portrays itself (as a civilian/normative power) and the perceptions held
of it in the rest of the world11. The EU’s visibility on the international scene
and its ‘actorness’ have unevenly increased and are not yet obvious on some
crucial international issues12.
Admittedly, these results could perhaps be enhanced by the insights pro-
duced by a more quantitative approach showing the linear progress of the EU
in respect of its unity and consistency within international organisations13.
But some authors tend to criticise statistical analyses because, in addition to
the fact that they do not tell us much about external perceptions, they often
remain beset by methodological problems. For instance, it would be mis-
leading to simply count all of the resolutions voted on by the EU members
together, insofar as most of the General Assembly resolutions are adopted
8Norway considers that it is easier to coordinate with other groups of countries than
with the EU, F. Creed, Global Perceptions of the European Union at the United Nations,
p.9.
9Fiona Creed, op.cit., p. 6.
10Robert Kissack, Pursuing Effective Multilateralism, p.47; Fiona Creed, op.cit., p. 7
et pp.10-11. The mantra of ‘speaking with one voice’ is simply the external consequence
of the way all EU policy is constructed and the reason for this. See, for instance, the
work of Majone, Europe as the would-be world power (2009) and Dilemmas of European
Integration - The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth, (2009).
11Fiona Creed, op.cit., p.5.
12Robert Kissack, Pursuing Effective Multilateralism, p.112.
13Rosemary Foot, The European Community’s voting behaviour at the United Nations
general assembly, JCMS, 17(4), 1979, pp.350-360; Ulf Jakobson, An international actor
under pressure: The impact of the war on terror and the fifth enlargement on EU voting
cohesion at the UN general assembly, 2000-2005, JCMS, 47(3), 2009, pp.531-554; Paul Luif
and Mariyana Radeva, EU Co-ordination in International Organisations: The Case of the
United Nations General Assembly and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe, in Nicola Casarini and Costanza Musu (eds), European Foreign Policy in an
evolving international system. The road towards convergence, Palgrave, 2007.
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by consensus, which does not allow us to draw convincing conclusions on
the EU’s unity. Furthermore, there is a tendency to explain the unity of
the EU by the existence of European institutions whereas other groups also
have good records of unity without the common institutions14. Most of all,
such analyses do not tell us much about the content of resolutions and the
motivations behind the voting attitudes of the EU members nor about the
way the EU is perceived by third states and groups15.
The main goal of this study was to attempt to add some meat to the
bones by questioning the political stakes under discussion at the UN.
Initial ambitions however proved to be somewhat unrealistic within the
context of time and budgetary constraints leading to a re-evaluation of what
was in fact possible. The main reason for this lies in the material itself.
It is simply too extensive in nature to be addressed through a qualitative
analysis of all official documents relating to GA sessions. It quickly became
apparent that it would be impossible to produce a truly historical overview
of EU politics within the GA and the way it was seen while also explaining
the minutiae of EU voting behaviour, not to speak of the other countries
and groups. Thus, we decided instead to focus on five sessions (60th to 64th)
and, particularly on the resolutions for which a vote was recorded, working
on the principle that, from a political or ideological point of view, this kind
of resolution is much more telling than the consensual ones16. Building on
this data, we have downloaded all the documents related to the sessions of
the GA available on the UN website. Unfortunately, the thorough reading
of the PV has been very disappointing insofar as there was nothing really
exciting for our purposes, except for the results of the vote: no real con-
troversies and nothing really relevant to explain what was really at stake,
but some interesting topics were referenced in the summary records of the
special committees. We decided therefore to turn to these committees which
appear to be far more interesting arenas for such research since they pro-
vided more extensive records of discussions between states and groups. As
it was impossible or at least difficult to separate discussion on the basis of
the result of the votes, we went through all the summary records, provided
the discussion involved the EU either as a speaker or as the referent object
of a speech.
Firstly, such an analysis enables us to test some of the insights connected
with the notion of the EU’s presence, visibility and legitimacy as a global ac-
tor. We have also tried to focus on some of the states targeted by the project
14See Laurent Beauguitte, op. cit.
15Robert Kissack, European Union Member State Coordination in the United Nations
System: How to Measure Cohesion?, CFSP Forum, 5(2), 2007, pp.3-4.
16Paul Luif and Maryana Radeva, EU Coordination in International Organisations.The
Case of the United Nations General Assembly and the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, Working Paper no3, 2007, Institute of European Studies and
International Relations, Comenius University.
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(Brazil, China, India and Cameroon) aiming at facilitating the transversal
analysis of the economic, financial and human flows between the EU and the
rest of the world.
On its own merits, the current analysis aims to test a number of ‘intuitive
hunches’ relating to some of the recent work on this topic:
• The first hypothesis concerns those reports highlighting the growing
convergence of EU member states, while at same time, taking stock of
the similar trend within other groups or regions. In so doing, the posi-
tive impact of ‘speaking with one voice’ is somewhat reduced. In a way,
this kind of analysis renders uncertain the link traditionally made be-
tween the unity of the EU and its correlative influence on world affairs
since this unity is sometimes tantamount to isolation within the GA
on certain topics. This hypothesis is rooted in an analysis highlight-
ing the ‘normative disconnect’ which is explained by the persistence of
different political visions and the uneven results of socialisation at the
international level17.
• The second hypothesis refers to an explanation which is less based on
the substance of the positions upheld by the states and their ideological
roots and rather more on the strategy and processes put in place by the
EU within the UN in order to consolidate its ‘actorness’ at the interna-
tional level. Thus, its bureaucratic functioning and its obsession with
projecting ‘unity’ constitute the root cause of its inability to be more
influential and to benefit from a kind of leadership role in this forum.
In this case, the EU’s strategy will often prove inefficient in achieving
its ambitions because it is focused primarily on process (coordination
and cooperation) and not on ideational contents and programmes.
This contribution does not however seek to definitively address the ques-
tion of EU ‘actorness’, or to assess the actual influence of the EU at the UN -
even in terms of its proper contribution to the functioning of the UN and the
performance of multilateral institutions18. By the same token, and contrary
to what the expression ‘international political vision’ suggests, the way the
EU is perceived by the UN institutions is not the object of the analysis, sim-
ply because such an approach would have required significant data-gathering
in both New York and Geneva.
The results of the analysis undertaken here could have been presented
in different ways. One such approach could have been framed according
17See Jonathan Holslag, Europe’s Normative Disconnect with Emerging Powers, BICCS,
Asia Paper, 5(4). This situation can also stem from the use of EU jargon, which other
partners often find difficult to understand, see the opinion of a US diplomat in Fiona
Creed, op.cit., p.14.
18See Karen Smith and Katie Verlin Laatikainen (eds), The European Union at the
United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralism, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2006; N. Casarini and
C. Musu (eds), op.cit., op.cit.
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the results of the votes in order to highlight the behaviour of EU members
among other meaningful actors. Another approach could have been more
fully centred on ideas and issues without being specially linked to a recorded
vote. The second option appeared more suitable as it is more focused on
political visions and more fitted to a study aiming at identifying the external
perceptions of the EU within the GA even if it remains quite difficult to draw
firm conclusions.
Indeed, the problem here is that official discourses may reveal the po-
litical preferences, interests, and values of the speakers but not directly the
perceptions of what the EU is or ought to be at the international level simply
because the EU is very rarely targeted as such. Official level exchanges are
deeply institutionalised and routines seem to be firmly embedded as shown
by the behaviour of the representatives of the states who rarely engage in
a real dialogue and direct interaction, which could have been a more conve-
nient format in order to grasp perceptions19. If direct confrontations may
occur and targeted critiques are displayed, this, in the main, occurs ‘off
record’. The summary records are, as is to be expected, full of traditional
diplomatic language (understatements, vague formulas or very technical re-
marks). Moreover, it would be naive to assume that all GA votes truly
correspond to the actual views of the states since some votes can be decided
for strategic reasons, independently of the content of the resolution, or even
pushed by external constraints. Therefore cognitive maps of the EU can
only result from the interpretation of both texts and contexts. Nevertheless
we must acknowledge the difficulty of identifying political ideas and adopted
positions and subsequently of translating them into perceptions.
The presentation will follow the work of the main committees of the GA
as explained here above. For each committee, a brief presentation of the EU’s
behaviour will be made before going into more detail concerning the political
ideas and positions upheld by the representatives of the states on the basis
of which we will try to pinpoint the main elements possibly underpinning
UN member States’ perceptions of the EU.
19Most of the currently available literature pertaining the study of the perceptions of
the EU as a global actor shows that semi-directed interviews are the most commonly
used method to collect empirical data. For a detailed discussion on the theoretical and
methodological approaches to the study of external perceptions of the EU, see Chaban,
Elgström and Holland, The European Union As Others See It, European Foreign Affairs
Review, 11(2), 2006, pp.245-262.
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1 Discussions in the first Committee (security and
disarmament)
France and the UK are the two member states that regularly break the
unity of the EU, especially in the security policy field20. In this case, their
vote is often similar to that of the US while other Europeans abstain. In
such a situation, the Europeans are defeated; the resolution supported by
non-aligned countries is adopted, etc. The topics covered by such a pattern
relate to ‘Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone
of Peace’ (A/C.1/64/L.8) and the ‘Promotion of multilateralism in the area
of disarmament and non-proliferation’ (A/C.1/64/L.13)21.
In another scenario, the EU is divided but the majority of its member
states vote for the resolution like the majority of UN members. This is gen-
erally the case for resolutions such as ‘Renewed determination towards the
total elimination of nuclear weapons’ (A/C.1/64/L.36)22, ‘Second Confer-
ence of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia’ (A/C.1/64/L.46/Rev.1), and ‘Towards a
nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear dis-
armament commitments’ (A/C.1/64/L.54)23.
Concerning the ‘Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’
(A/C.1/64/L.51), the EU is completely divided (some vote for, some against
and some abstain)24.
The EU speaks with one voice (with or without the USA) but is defeated
on topics like ‘Reducing nuclear danger’ (A/C.1/64/L.18)25, and ‘Nuclear
20Paul Luif, op. cit., p.17
21A/C.1/64/PV.16, p.16, intervention of the representative of Cuba who stands firm on
the principle of multilateral negotiations instead of unilateral measures for disarmament
imposed by the powerful countries resorting to the use of force or the threat of use of
force.
22France’s position on this topic is partly determined by the fact that the resolution does
not give a complete picture of efforts in the area of nuclear disarmament, A/C.1/64/PV.21,
p.4.
23The draft resolution was introduced by Brazil, which is in favour of the total elimina-
tion of nuclear weapons, A/C.1/64/PV.19, p.5.
24It is possible that a certain amount of Putnam-style ‘two-level games’ is being played
out here. . . See RD Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of two-level
games, in Evans, Jacobsen and Putnam (eds) Double Edged Diplomacy -International
Bargaining and Domestic Politics. The small EU states ‘know’ what the UK/FR position
is and know, therefore, that they can, in some cases, afford to vote the other way with-
out changing a major result, particularly if there are domestic level political advantages
attached (in relation to nuclear weapons issues for example).
25In the context of the proceedings we have the result of the vote but it is often not
clear why the underlying votes went as they did because voting is often not clearly linked
to a specific debate but to general statements made by all the members, A/C.1/64/PV.
19, p.19. Later on, the representative of Brazil underlines the necessity to review nuclear
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disarmament’ (A/C.1/64/L.48). On the ‘Implementation of the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
personnel Mines and on Their Destruction’ (A/C.1/64/L.53), the member
states speak with one voice and vote with the majority.
In addition, there are many representatives speaking on behalf of a group
of states. On the issues of security and disarmament, the G77 (encompass-
ing 130 UN members) and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (MNA)
appear to be quite active, but like the EU not always consistent and united.
As a matter of fact the BRIC focus on their own particular interests - which
sometimes co-inside - and on views which lead them to cast a vote that can
often be different from the rest of the G77, the MNA or the EU on ‘Conven-
tional arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels’ (A/C.1/64/L.29),
‘Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons’
(A/C.1/64/L.36), ‘The arms trade treaty’ (A/C.1/64/L.3826), only Zim-
babwe opposed, China, Russia and India abstained27). China is, accord-
ing to its representative, the only nuclear power to stand for the complete
prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and is committed
to a strategy of self-defence (no first use); China commits itself not to use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or nuclear-
weapon-free-zones28.
It is not clear that the BRICs currently form what could be termed, an
emerging political bloc, they generally agree about what they dislike but
not about what they like. For instance, India often justifies its abstention
or opposition to certain resolutions on highly legalist grounds, noting that
if a state does not freely consent to be bound by a treaty, it cannot be
compelled by its provisions29. This is also a question of principle relating to
the sovereignty of states. Though India rhetorically shares the goal of nuclear
disarmament in general, it feels uncomfortable with the NPT while, at the
same time, professing to share the concerns of the NAM30. India considers
itself a nuclear-weapon state and thus cannot accept being invited into the
NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state31.
doctrines to reduce the risks of the unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons and
repeats Brazil’s commitment in respect of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons;
both elements could explain the vote of some EU members, ibid., pp.27-28.
26Proposed by the UK alone: A/C.1/64/PV.16, p.7. See also the A/C.1/64, PV.22,
p.15: presentation of the EU’s deeds in respect of the Arms Trade Treaty.
27These states seemingly regret that the process of negotiation was not inclusive and
transparent (A/C.1/64/PV.22, pp.19-20 and p.22). China in particular was disappointed
by the fact that consensus was not reached (A/C.1/64/PV.23, p.1) and Zimbabwe con-
siders that the promoters have not taken into consideration the interests and concerns of
all member states and were too influenced by civil society campaigns (ibid., p.2).
28A/C.3/64/PV.910, p.20.
29A/C.1/64/PV.19, p.23.
30A/C.1/64/PV.19, p.24.
31Ibid, the same kind of argument is used by Pakistan, A/C.1/64/PV.19, p.25. It is also
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Interestingly enough, some statements made by the UK representative
are delivered on a national basis or on behalf of the UK, France and the
US32. The very fact that the ASEAN countries have not yet responded to
the non-paper submitted by the three countries and Russia seems to explain
their critical position regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon free
zone in South-East Asia. Criticism is targeted not so much at the principle
of establishing such free zones as at the process through which this kind of
arrangement has been negotiated. The opposition of some Western countries
is justified by the non-compliance with the guidelines set by the UN and the
fact that the nuclear-weapon states have not been consulted. What seems to
be disturbing in this case is that some free zones can be composed of parts
of high seas which are submitted to the rule of the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea guaranteeing the right of passage and the freedom of the
high seas33. It is thus understandable that nuclear powers vote against such
resolutions that could impinge upon their military manoeuvres.
These two examples of controversial statements epitomise the enduring
importance for all states of defending their sovereignty in security matters
and the freedom of action inherent in this principle that is also granted by
several international instruments.
Sweden and Ireland are members of the ‘New Agenda Coalition’ (with
Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, Mexico, and New Zealand) all of whom share
the common goal of making the world free of nuclear weapons and do not
accept any justification for the acquisition or indefinite possession of such
arms34. The EU as such cannot be in favour of a total elimination of nuclear
weapons since two of its members are nuclear powers. On these kinds of
issues, the representatives of the UK and France tend to deliver the position
of their countries while the EU tends to focus more on non-proliferation than
on disarmament35. As a result, British and French nuclear policies are never
evoked while other the policies of other nuclear powers are commented on at
length36.
The conflict between Israel and its neighbours is also a source of con-
troversy and division. On this issue the EU members are generally in line
but their positions are not always seen as being consistent. For instance,
some UN members ask Israel, India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT and
to place their facilities under the control of IAEA. The EU, however, has
never made such a request to the Israeli authorities, which could explain the
clear that for India, nuclear weapons are part of its national security policy and will remain
so ‘pending non-discriminatory and global nuclear disarmament’, A/C.1/64/PV.21, p.6.
32A/C.1/64/PV.19, p.24.
33Ibid., p.25.
34A/C.3/64/PV.2, p.15.
35/C.3/64/PV.10, pp.10-11. The French representative mentions the EU’s policy con-
trary to his UK counterpart, p.13.
36A/C.3/64/PV.9, pp.10-11.
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accusation of double standards raised by some states like Egypt37 or Syria38.
At the same time, however, there is clear support for the establishment of
a nuclear free zone in the Middle East39. Reading the position delivered by
the representative of Sweden on behalf of the EU, there is a clear invita-
tion for the states of the region to accede to the NPT, but no reference to
Israeli policy in this field is made. The only state to be explicitly targeted
is Iran40, whose delegate denounces some EU members for their inaction at
the Security Council regarding the Israeli nuclear programme41. The EU
is mentioned here in relation to Iran in respect of its ambition to develop
nuclear facilities. In the view of the representative of Iran, some members do
not comply with their obligations under the NPT since they have received
hundreds of nuclear weapons from the USA under the NATO umbrella42.
According to Pakistan, the expansion of military alliances such as NATO
which retain the option to use nuclear weapons is ‘inconsistent with the
negative security assurances of its nuclear-weapon states members’43. In this
case, the fact that the majority of EU members belong to NATO sustains the
image of the EU being a component of the Western world (‘Global North’)
along with the US and its other main allies. For the NAM members (‘Global
South’), it is always worth remembering that industrialised countries are
the main producers and traders of small arms and light weapons that also
represent a great danger for international peace and security44.
Another stumbling block to further advancement in this field is the link
made in the discourse of less developed countries between disarmament and
development. States like France are convinced that the relationship between
the two is more complex than in draft resolutions stating that the resources
devoted to military spending should instead be diverted to developments
needs45.
During the debate on chemical and biological weapons the EU’s discourse
clearly stressed the danger of seeing these kinds of weapons falling into the
hands of terrorist groups46 and invited states to cooperate and implement
their obligations stemming from the existing instruments47. The EU also
offers its assistance for this purpose. In fact, the representative speaking
on behalf of the EU here gave the impression that the EU existed above
37A/C.3/64/PV.4, p.13.
38A/C.3/64/PV.6, p.4.
39A/C.3/64/PV.9, p.12.
40A/C.1/64/PV.19, p.7.
41A/C.1/64/PV. 19, p.10.
42A/C.3/64/PV.11, pp.16-17.
43A/C.1/64/PV.19, p.4.
44A/C.1/64/PV.14, p.12 and p.17.
45A/C.1/64/PV.20, p.19.
46A/C.1/64/PV.12, p.16.
47A/C.1/64/PV.12, p.6
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the level of the state48. The speech delivered in the EU’s name sounds
more like those delivered by those responsible for the various programmes
elaborated for eliminating biological and chemical weapons49. The neces-
sity to have legal provisions implemented is also underscored and for this
particular issue, the EU does not mince its words: ‘Regular and concrete
counter-proliferation actions are therefore required to ensure that each state
complies with its non-proliferation obligations. If it is to be effective, our
action against proliferation must thus be based on resolute operational coop-
eration to prevent and disrupt illicit transfers, to control exports even more
effectively, to counter illegal networks of diversion and trafficking, and to
combat proliferation financing’50. This must be ‘effective’ multilateralism.
In addition, the security policy of the EU is heavily dependent on its member
states and even if it has developed military instruments and launched mili-
tary missions, the EU does not have a consistent military doctrine - despite
the existence since 2003 of a European Security Strategy - that could give
a clear indication of what would be a truly European policy in this field51.
This is perhaps why, on some occasions, the messages delivered in the name
of the EU seem rather puzzling.
It seems equally difficult for the EU to be seen as the genuine standard
bearer for multilateralism despite the fact that it is trumpeted in various
ways by the EU. For instance, and compared to the EU’s speeches, the
NAM recalls more clearly the importance of keeping the disarmament and
non-proliferation issues under the auspices of the UN and of abiding by in-
ternational law52. In fact, the draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.13 entitled, ‘Pro-
motion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation’
and submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the NAM was not really welcomed
by the EU members, the UK voted against and the others abstained53.
The NAM also criticises the fact that the Security Council uses its au-
thority to define legislative requirements for member states whereas the prob-
lem of non-state actors and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) needs to
be addressed in a more inclusive manner by the GA54, a form of criticism
which actually relates more to the problem of democracy in global gover-
nance than multilateralism but about which the EU remains silent. In the
same vein, the representative of Cuba deplores the fact that some ‘pluri-
48The representative of Iran reminds us that some EU members bear a clear respon-
sibility for the use of chemical weapons against Iranians and Iraqis because they have
provided sensitive materials that enabled Saddam Hussein’s regime to manufacture such
lethal weapons, A/C.1/64/PV.12, p.23.
49A/C.1/64/PV.12, pp.6-7.
50A/C.1/64/PV.12, p.7.
51Richard Whitman, The EU: Standing Aside from the Changing Global Balance of
Power, Politics, 30(S1), 2010, pp.24-32.
52 A/C.1/64/PV.20, p.15.
53A/C.1/64/PV. 20, p.17.
54A/C.1/64/PV.12, p.16.
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lateral initiatives’ promoted by a group of countries like the ‘Proliferation
security initiative’ launched by the US, weakens the role of the UN55. This is
also pinpointed in the speech delivered by the representative of Egypt, who
noted that the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Ottawa Convention
are other examples of initiatives (supported by EU members) bypassing the
UN multilateral framework56. One of the grievances expressed by some less
developed countries regarding for instance the ‘comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty’ is linked to the fact that its provisions do not guarantee access to
new technology for accelerating their development while developing countries
are able to stop experimenting with their weapons by improving their arse-
nals through means other than detonations57. First and foremost, they have
no guarantee from the traditional nuclear weapons states that they will not
be targeted and they cannot rely on the Security Council to get what they
want while powerful countries are able to draw on the authority of Chapter
VII to impose their will and protect their interests58. In brief, the ability to
resort to the Security Council with a view to imposing certain obligations in
the area of disarmament leads to double standard policies59, not to speak of
the unilateral moves that also contribute to the erosion of multilateralism as
acknowledged in the resolution on the ‘Promotion of multilateralism in the
area of disarmament and non-proliferation.’60
Conclusion
Security and disarmament are not topics about which the EU has developed
a high profile and demonstrated a great deal of unity and consistency. It
is crystal-clear that the peculiar situation of the UK and France - being
nuclear weapons states and permanent members of the Security Council -
determines their votes and explain the fact that EU votes split in certain
sensitive areas. Besides, being part of a security alliance like NATO, whose
strategic doctrine has historically relied on the possession of nuclear weapons,
55A/C.1/64/PV.12, p.18.
56A/C.1/64/PV. 20, p.7. See also the critical standpoints of India and Russia on this
issue (ibid., p.8) as well as the explanation of the vote given by the representative of Egypt,
who recalls that the Ottawa convention has been negotiated outside the UN and does not
contain any obligation for the state in terms of demining while in Egypt, millions of anti-
personnel landmines have been planted by the second world war combatants in the western
desert, A/C.1/64/PV.21, p.15. The same criticism is also issued by the representative of
the Libyan Arab Jamahirya, ibid., p.18.
57The 2010 Anglo-French defence deal between Cameron and Sarkozy reiterated that
both would continue to field a nuclear deterrent. One of the main provisions of the deal is
the provision for joint (simulated) nuclear testing - obviously very technical and no doubt
hugely expensive - but designed to get round the test-ban issue. The newer nuclear states
are unlikely to be able to afford such technology and will thus either have to contravene
the ban or not test/update their stockpiles, thus giving UK/FR a political advantage.
58A/C.1/64/PV. 22, p.10.
59A/C.1/64/PV. 22, pp. 12-13.
60A/RES/64/34.
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can also explain the attitudes of some member states while others are more
prone to follow the projects sustained by more ambitious countries or groups,
like the NAM, in the field of disarmament, and in particular in respect of
the establishment on nuclear-free zones. Even in crisis management when
the EU is directly concerned like in Georgia, no reference is generally made
to its own commitment61.
What is perhaps most striking when contemplating the EU’s self-image
and the criticisms surfacing in other groups’ discourses is that Europeans
are not the only ones to foster multilateralism; on the contrary, they are
sometimes suspected of attempting to bypass UN institutions for the sake of
adopting conventions which would be more consistent with their normative
preferences (the Ottawa convention for instance) but which, at the same
time, do not impinge on their own interests and agendas. Despite its ongoing
endeavours towards disarmament and non-proliferation, the EU is not even
mentioned by the representative of the Regional Centre on small arms and
light weapons who acknowledge only the support of states like Germany, the
UK, the Netherlands, USA, Japan, and Belgium62. Indeed, on this matter
the OSCE seems to be more visible than the EU63.
There is however something that singles out the EU: its clear message
about the necessity to include civil society in the discussion of international
problems echoing the point made by UN personal.
2 Discussions in the second Committee (macroeco-
nomic Policy questions: international trade and
development)
As for the other committees, the vast majority of resolutions debated in
the second committee are adopted by consensus, even those dealing with a
priori divisive topics like women in development (A/RES/64/217) or corrup-
tion (A/RES/64/237). There are nonetheless some topics that are still hotly
debated and for which no consensus has been reached. This is particularly
the case for the promotion of development in the context of globalisation and
interdependence, for which the ‘international community’ has been mostly
divided along North-South lines. For the EU, the reference to the old reso-
lutions of the 1970s on this topic - a reminder of the discourse on the New
International Economic Order - is no longer relevant and indeed is tanta-
mount to ‘turning the clock back to obsolete discussions’; this was the main
61A/C.1/64/PV.17, pp.9-10. The EU is nonetheless mentioned but only through a
reference to the report of an independent fact-finding mission on the causes of the conflict,
ibid., p.18.
62A/C.1/64/PV.17, p.16.
63A/C.1/64/PV.16, p.10.
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reason explaining the abstention of the EU members64. But what is strik-
ing here is the fact that the cohesion of the EU is maintained: all the EU
members have voted in the same way65.
On the chapter on Globalisation and Interdependence and on the ‘Right
to Development’, it is quite clear that the EU and the US do not share the
same ideas. The latter understands it as the possibility for each individual
‘to enjoy the right to develop his or her intellectual and other capabilities
to the maximum extent possible through the exercise of the full range of
civil and political rights’66. The vision of the EU is also liberal-inspired but
differently framed:
The EU attached great importance to the social dimension of glob-
alisation and was committed to internal and external policies that
contributed to maximising the benefits and minimising the costs
of globalisation for all countries. It welcomed efforts to promote
corporate social responsibility and encouraged the private sector
to contribute to corporate social responsibility initiatives that fos-
tered fair globalisation. The EU underlined the importance of
the relationship between business sector development and pro-poor
growth and was undertaking a range of initiatives to enhance the
role of the private sector in development.67
The difference with the US mainly lies in the fact that the EU clearly envis-
ages the development as a public policy supplemented by the private sector
and does not really consider, as the US does, the fight against poverty as an
individual responsibility.
On international Trade and Development, the USA has expressed con-
cerns regarding the possibility of an overlap between the UN and the WTO
and is willing to prevent any endeavour that could jeopardise negotiations at
the WTO68. For the EU, a political consensus message on this issue sent by
the GA ‘would have allowed the international community to reconfirm its full
commitment to the broad and balanced WTO Doha development agenda,
particularly its development dimension’69. Two visions (at least) are at play
and the 64th session will confirm the deadlock. The draft resolution pre-
sented by the G77 and China contains provisions pointing to the high level
of export subsidies, trade-distorting domestic support and protectionism of
many developed countries. In the context of the financial crisis, the need for
64A/C.2/64/SR.40, p.3, see A/RES/64/209.
65A/64/PV.66.
66A/C.2/60/SR.37, p.6.
67A/C.2/60/SR.37, p.6.
68A/C.2/60/SR.35, p.3.
69A/C.2/60/SR.35, p.4. But at the same time, the EU members chose to abstain since
some paragraphs of the draft resolution ‘could create uncertainties in relation to the EU’s
WTO commitments.’
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greater coherence in the trade, financial and monetary systems is underlined
along with the need to refrain from adopting measures related to trade and
affecting the access by developing countries to generic medicines and the
necessity for developed countries to be more flexible in their negotiations
within the WTO70. The US still argues that opening markets will reduce
poverty and hunger and does not view the resolution as a constructive basis
for a fair and inclusive dialogue71. The EU’s representative has expressed his
disappointment with the move of the G77 and China that makes impossible
to reach a consensus, mostly because the views exposed therein are one-sided
and do not take into account the fact that the major trading partners are not
the same as those of 10 years ago. He still considers that emerging economies
should open their markets72. A member of the European Commission speak-
ing in the name of the EU73 and other candidate countries has also explained
at length the vision the EU has for overcoming the economic and financial
crisis through the commitment of national governments and thanks to the
conclusion of the Doha round, reminding us of the openness of EU markets
to products from the least developed countries and, more generally the huge
efforts made by the EU to neutralise the damaging effects of the crisis in the
poorest countries, notably by increasing its official development assistance
(ODA)74, something that is not really acknowledged in the interventions
made by other members of the Committee75. Eventually, however, the EU
member states voted against the resolution A/RES/64/188 along with the
US and other Western countries76.
The stumbling block preventing any further progress on ‘trade and de-
velopment’ revolves around the possibility of using unilateral economic mea-
sures against the developing countries for economic or political reasons (A/-
RES/64/189). According to the USA, it is legitimate to resort to such means
in order to promote national interests. It is a right inherent in the principle of
sovereignty77. For the spokesman of the EU, such unilateral measures must
70See the draft resolution presented by Sudan on behalf of the G77 and China,
A/C.2/64/L.40, p.2. A/RES/64/209 will be adopted with 50 abstentions.
71A/C.2/64/L.42, p.2. Later on the US representative questions the role of the UN in
dealing with the financial crisis, expressing doubts about the capacity of the UN system
in comparison with other institutions like the IMF and the G-20. The representatives
from the EU, Canada and Mexico have all mentioned the positive role of G-20 in the
management of the crisis.
72A/C.2/64/L.42, p.3.
73The mere fact that someone from the European Commission has spoken on behalf of
the EU here is to be underlined. It shows the strength of this institution in matters related
to trade. But it is the only example of the EU speaking through its own institutions within
the GA.
74A/C.2/64/SR.25, pp.5-6; A/C.2/64/SR.14, p.3.
75See also the debate on the external debt problems of the developing countries where the
G-20 is mentioned several times in the discussion but not the EU as such, A/C.2/64/SR.8.
76A/64/PV.66, p.12.
77A/C.2/64/SR.41, p.3.
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respect international law and they are justified in certain circumstances, for
instance for combating terrorism and the spread of WMD, restoring democ-
racy and the rule of law, and making human rights effective. In any case,
the EU has to develop a comprehensive approach encompassing political
dialogue, conditionality and, in the very last resort, the use of force while
respecting the UN Charter78. In order to better understand this debate, it
is worth going back to the 60th session.
The G77 with China (also supported by CARICOM) have strongly crit-
icised unilateral sanctions79, and especially embargoes against developing
countries, drawing on the necessity to respect the sovereign equality of states,
non-interference in domestic affairs and self-determination for peoples as
outlined during the 60th anniversary of the UN. According to the Chinese
representative, those principles are still not respected:
Regrettably, however, in spite of the fact that our discussion of
this agenda item has entered its fourteenth year, the previous 13
resolutions urging all countries to abide by the Charter of the UN
and principles of international law and to withdraw or nullify any
laws and measures with extraterritorial legal effects that infringe
on the legitimate rights and interests of entities and individuals
within the sovereignty and jurisdiction of other states and impede
the freedom of trade or navigation, have yet to be implemented
by the state concerned.80
The US embargo against Cuba is particularly targeted by such critics,
the US being ostracised in this case for being in contradiction with the right
of people to choose their own political regime and development path, and
more specifically for having adopted economic decisions with extraterritorial
effects that contravene the principle of state sovereignty on its own territory.
Here again, the EU position, as expressed by the representative of the
UK, is based on a peculiar argument that singles out the EU in the debate
and will lead to abstention81. On the one hand, he reminds us that the
problem between the US and Cuba is fundamentally a bilateral one, echoing
the argument used by the US representative while, on the other, he criticises
78A/C.2/64/SR.41, p.4.
79The Mexican representative specifies that only the Council or the GA have the power
to decide or recommend such sanctions. During the 61st session, the representative of
Belarus denounced the ‘Belarus Democratic Act’ adopted by the US Congress enabling
the allocation of funds for opponents to the regime, which is considered as a attempt to
change the constitutional order of a sovereign country and criticised the fact that the EU
was contemplating unilateral sanctions against his country, A/61/PV.81, p.25.
80A/60/PV.45, Russia shares this critical standpoint insisting on the negative side effects
of such unilateral measures.
81A/64/PV.66, p.13.
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the extraterritorial laws adopted by the US82. The draft resolution will finally
be adopted (A/60/L.9) with 182 votes including all the EU members, the
MERCOSUR83 and other associated States who have justified their support
by reference to the principles evoked by the G77 and China84. Although all
the EU member States have voted for the resolution, the representative of
Cuba will deliver a statement, giving a negative picture of the EU (proving
once more the interest of combining qualitative and raw data):
Year after year, we have listened to the representatives of the Eu-
ropean Union repeat their hackneyed arguments to explain their
vote, during the adoption of the resolution that condemns the
blockade by the United States of America against the Cuban peo-
ple. The European Union, through a complex word game, is trying
to hide the fact that the United States has launched an economic
war against Cuba, that it is truly committing genocide and has
been causing serious damage to the Cuban people for more than
47 years, only because of Cuba’s refusal to become a pawn in the
geopolitics of that unipolar power. The European Union is only
interested in the extraterritorial content of the imperial decree,
not in its victims, the men and women of Cuba. The worst fallacy
is trying to suggest that we deserve such actions. It seems that
unless its economic interests are affected, the European Union will
show itself to be indifferent or, worse still, cooperative, if the em-
pire decides to apply sanctions that go against international law
and against a dignified and brave people. The European Union
acts as an accomplice to the United States, when they favour and
condone the false pretext that has been created to maintain and
strengthen the hostile policy of genocide against the Cuban peo-
ple. How can they dare speak of human rights Ů those who have
extended a cloak of impunity to the perpetrators of atrocious hu-
man rights violations in the concentration camps established in
the territory that is illegally occupied in Guantánamo, as well as
extra-judicial executions and cruel and humiliating torture at Abu
Ghraib.85
In this case, the EU appears as an international actor capable of defining
and defending its own economic interests. Interestingly enough, during the
debate about the consequences of the financial crisis and the risk of slipping
back into protectionist policies, the voice of the EU has been expressed by
82This is the reason why Australia issued a positive vote, A/61/PV.50; A/62/PV.38,
pp.19-20.
83See also A/62/PV.38.
84During the 63rd session, the same debate will occur with the same arguments and
results, GA/10772, 29 October 2008.
85A/60/PV.45, p.26.
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the European Commission86 and not the representative of the EU country
in charge of the presidency.
Despite the fact that the resolution dealing with the fight against de-
sertification has finally been adopted by consensus (A/RES/64/201), the
discussion that occurred in the second committee shows that once more, the
conflict in the Middle East infuses all the debates within the GA. The Euro-
pean countries have supported an amendment introduced by Israel in sup-
port of the implementation of the UN convention to combat desertification.
According to the UK representative, ‘it believed that it was fair to include
mention in the resolution of any government-sponsored international meeting
that would focus on, and contribute to, the objectives of the International
year of Deserts and Desertification. The proposed Be’erSheva conference fits
those criteria.87’ But for those who vote against or abstain, like the rep-
resentative of Mauritania speaking on behalf of the group of Arab States:
‘Israel was seeking international endorsement and support for its planned
conference on desertification even though it had refused to take responsibil-
ity for its own desertification-causing practices. Those devastating practices
had been well documented in various reports [. . . ]. The Committee itself
had recently adopted a draft resolution condemning the illegal exploitation
of Palestinian land, the detrimental effects of the unlawful construction of
the wall, the uprooting of fruit-bearing trees and the razing of land in the
occupied Palestinian Territory.88’ In this case, the European Union, like Is-
rael, Canada and the United States, seems to regret the politicisation of an
issue that should, according to them, be viewed as technical.
Conclusion
On Trade and Development the US and the EU seem to share common in-
terests and are willing to achieve the same goals (especially in respect of
concerns relating to UN/WTO overlap, the need to depoliticise certain is-
sues and the conviction that the time for a new economic order has passed),
but the justifications are different from a political point of view. On the
eradication of poverty the US representative leans more on individual re-
sponsibility whereas the European’s approach is more holistic and geared to
the reduction of poverty through public policy. On unilateral sanctions, the
EU’s position is also more consistent with the principle of sovereignty that
the G77 is eager to defend. In a way, this kind of issue could actually lead
the EU to play the role of bridge builder it seeks, as is sometimes pointed
out in the literature89. In addition and as has already been stated by Paul
86A/C.2./64/SR.25, p.5.
87A/C.2/60/SR.38, p.3.
88A/C.2/60/SR.38, p.3.
89Richard Gowan and Franziska Brantner, A Global Force for Human Rights? An Audit
of European Power at the UN, Policy paper of the European Council on Foreign Relations,
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Luif, the EU Countries are more proactive in economic and financial matters
and are the principal negotiating partner for the G7790.
3 Discussions in the third Committee (social, hu-
manitarian and cultural)
Some member states sponsor a resolution, other follow, the resolution is
adopted but without the support of the BRICS (or other countries like
Cameroon). This is the pattern for draft resolution on ‘The situation of hu-
man rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (A/C.3/64/L.35),
‘The situation of human rights in Myanmar’ (A/C.3/64/L.36), and the ‘Sit-
uation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (A/C.3/64/L.37).
When ‘The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination’ (A/C.3/64/-
L.56) is at stake, the support appears to be much more important compared
to the votes on resolutions condemning the three traditional targets of West-
ern powers that do not benefit from the support of the entire G77. In such
cases, the EU is proactive, united and successful91.
When the EU members are against the resolution or abstain, the iden-
tity of the state sponsoring the resolution is important to understand the
opposition as much as its content. Here again the EU position can be la-
belled as ‘Western’. This is the case, for the ‘Use of mercenaries as a means
of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples
to self-determination’ (A/C.3/64/L.57), ‘Combating defamation of religions’
(A/C.3/64/L.27), ‘Promotion of a democratic and equitable international or-
der’ (A/C.3/64/L.28), ‘Globalisation and its impact on the full enjoyment
of all human rights’ (A/C.3/64/L.31), ‘Human rights and unilateral coercive
measures’ (A/C.3/64/L.45), ‘Promotion of equitable geographical distribu-
tion in the membership of the human rights treaty bodies’ (A/C.3/64/L.48),
and, Human rights and cultural diversity’ (A/C.3/64/L.49).
The EU is divided on ‘The right to development’ (A/C.3/64/L.47) and
the ‘Inadmissibility of certain practices that contribute to fuelling contem-
porary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intol-
erance’ (A/C.3/64/L.53).
The analysis of the summary records available on the UN website sheds
light on the ideas that could be considered as divisive or controversial be-
tween the EU and the other UN members or within EU itself.
2008.
90Paul Luif, op. cit., p.22.
91On some occasions, the EU follows a proposition made by the US (but not supported
by other countries like China and Russia) like that ‘Strengthening the role of the United
Nations in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections
and the promotion of democratisation’ (A/C.3/64/L.26).
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The issue of the defamation of religion is easy to misunderstand. While
the G77 and China insist on the fact that freedom of speech cannot be an
excuse for not diffusing feelings of hatred against groups and religions92,
Europeans tend to consider that ‘the concept of the defamation of religion
might be depolarised by shifting it towards the legal concept of prohibit-
ing incitement to racial and religious hatred’93. In their view, there is no
real need to create a new norm and to singularise the issue of religion94.
Moreover, freedom of speech is deemed to be of the utmost importance to
fight racism95 along with the freedom of expression96. Unsurprisingly, the
representative of Malaysia speaking on behalf of the OCI demonstrates that
racism and defamation of religion are intrinsically linked97.
Regarding the follow-up to the Durban conference and, more generally,
the issue of combating racism and xenophobia, some differences can also be
pinpointed in the statements made by the EU and some other members. In-
deed, representatives of the EU are eager to demonstrate the willingness of
the states to adopt laws and regulations to get rid of the scourge of discrimi-
nation and racism in Europe98. But, they rarely mention concrete situations
and policies that are problematic in this regard, whereas the SADC, the G77
and China exposed their concerns about the ‘ethnicisation and criminalisa-
tion of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers’99 not even to speak about
anti-terrorism policies100, something that could be interpreted as an indirect
criticism of the western and/or rich countries101. This is particularly obvious
in the statement issued by the representative of Cuba:
[. . . ] racial discrimination had been bolstered by the rise of anti-
immigrant, xenophobic, right-wing parties in developed countries,
which, in turn, had led to an ideologically motivated campaign by
Western media to demonise Islam. Consequently, freedom of ex-
pression was invoked to defend intellectual legitimisation of ideas
inspired by racial hatred, as demonstrated by anti-terrorism and
92A/C.3/63/SR.33, p.6; A/C.3/64/SR.37, p.2.
93Ms Basso speaking on behalf of the EU, A/C.3/63/SR.33, p.3.
94A/C.3/64/SR.36, p.11.
95A/C.3/63/SR.33, p.8.
96A/C.3/63/SR.35, p. 7; A/C.3/64/SR.36, p.10.
97A/C.3/64/SR.36, p.4. For the representative of Iran, ‘Islamophobia’ and racial and
religious profiling must be taken into consideration by the members of the special com-
mittee, A/C.3/64/SR.37, p.5.
98Mr Gonnet speaking on behalf of the EU, A/C.3/63/SR.33, p.7; see also Mrs Martens-
son, A/C.3/64/SR.36, p.10; A/61/PV.81, p.9.
99A/C.3/63/SR.33, p.7.
100A/C.3/63/SR.35, p. 5. Statement made by the representative of Algeria.
101In his report (A/64/271), the rapporteur Muigai mentions the dramatic situation
of Roma communities in Europe, A/C.3/64/SR.36, p.3 and stresses the growing success
of extremist parties in Europe where they are tolerated in the name of the freedom of
expression, A/C.3/64/SR.36, p.6.
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anti-immigrant legislation in those countries. In that connection,
the so-called return directive adopted by the European Union was
troubling102.
In the same vein, the Russian representative states that the European
Union is quite passive as regards serious discrimination against minorities,
probably wanting here to draw attention to the situation of the Russian
minorities in the Baltic States103. Russia also underlines the resurgence of
neo-Nazi groups and a cold-war mentality in order to better tackle the prob-
lem on the ground. In this perspective, the role played by Russia during the
WWII is purportedly evoked104. It is also worth noting that some countries
like India link racism and colonialism105, a combination of words absent from
the European discourse.
A very important debate about economic, social and cultural rights also
reveals a different understanding of the link between those rights and civil
and political rights. The European countries, while constantly reaffirming
the unity and indivisibility of human rights, are not thrilled by the idea of
having a new protocol enabling individuals to use a complaint mechanism
to ensure that those rights are effectively implemented. For the representa-
tive of Denmark, such a mechanism is not fitted for this type of rights since
they have no immediate legal effect. What is striking here is the following
argument: ‘Given the nature of those rights, his delegation feared that the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights would end up function-
ing as a legislator and determining the allocation of states parties’ resources
in that sphere, when that was the responsibility of the legitimately elected
national democratic institutions’106; because it resembles the one opposed
by countries that use to criticise the European initiative on death penalty
arguing that this was not an issue of human rights but one of the national
judicial policy of sovereign states and therefore not consistent with the rule
of non-interference enshrined in the UN Charter107. Europeans do not seem
to agree with the view that without the realisation of economic, social and
cultural rights, civil and political rights are meaningless, something that can
be found in the discourse of countries like South Africa108.
102A/C.3/63/SR.33, p.8. See also, A/C.3/64/SR.36, p.5.
103A/C.3/63/SR.33, p.10.
104A/C.3/64/SR.41, p.3.
105A/C.3/64/SR.37, p.8.
106A/C.3/63/SR.35, p.5. See also the statements delivered by the representative of
Norway (ibid., p.6), Switzerland (ibid., p.7), and Poland (ibid., p.8). The representative
of Australia is also rebutted the idea that the Committee could be seized of complaints of
violations of a collective right, including the right to self-determination, which is in a way
illustrative of the reluctance of Western countries towards the ‘judicialisation’ of collective
rights (ibid., p.8).
107Robert Kissack, op. cit., p.54. See the intervention of the representative of Singapore,
which epitomises the position adopted by many states, A/61/PV.81, pp.33-34.
108A/C.3/63/SR.35, p.5.
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The EU members are also not entirely convinced by the wording of a
resolution about the universal realisation of the right of peoples to self-
determination. The representative of Sweden considers that the main fo-
cus is too narrow. Indeed the cases that are mainly targeted by the draft
resolution are occupation and foreign and colonial domination whereas self-
determination for Europeans is also linked to the right to democracy. He
regrets some ‘inaccuracies’ - peoples, not nations, are the beneficiaries of this
right - and adds that there is no mention of the fact that the implementation
of this right must be consistent with international law and is not a precondi-
tion for the enjoyment of other fundamental rights109 . This position could
not only be explained by reference to the individualist conception of Human
Rights underpinning a Western liberal ideology geared to the encouragement
of democracy all over the world, but also by the controversy surrounding the
legitimate means to achieve self-determination. For instance, the representa-
tive from Pakistan reminds that the use of force in order to occupy a foreign
territory is contrary to the right of self-determination and, therefore, the
fight against foreign occupation is legal and legitimate and cannot be as-
similated to a terrorist activity110. Such a standpoint is not shared by the
Western nations, which are reluctant to accept any kind of justification for
violent acts committed by groups, movements or individuals even grounded
on ‘legitimate’ ends. This is actually one of the reasons why it is so difficult
to get a universal definition of terrorism. Here again, the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict can in part be explained by reference to these conflicting views. And
if members of the EU always agree to recognise the principle of the right to
self-determination for the Palestinians, contrary to the US, they do not seem
to be ready to accept the use of force in order to implement this right111.
The growing activities of private military and security companies (PMC)
have reactivated discussion within the UN over mercenaries112 and raised
interesting principled debates among its members. We can identify differ-
ent positions regarding this phenomenon. Traditionally, mercenary activi-
109A/C.3/64/SR.41, p.4. See also the statement issued by the representative of Al-
geria, A/C.3/64/SR.37, p.2. In a very brief statement, the representative of the USA
considers that there are a lot of inaccuracies in this proposal and the interpretation of
self-determination is no longer consistent with current practice, A/C.3/64/SR.41, p.5.
110A/C.3/64/SR.37, p.2. The representative of Egypt also considers that there is a
right to resistance in such a situation almost as sacred as the right to self-defence against
those who impose their economic and military might while at the same time supposedly
defending Human rights and democracy (ibid., p.3).
111For the US representative, the text of the draft resolution is unbalanced because it
prejudges the outcome of the permanent status issues that have to be resolved through
bilateral negotiations, something that is often raised by Israel, A/C.3/64/SR.41, pp.5-6.
The representative of Australia justifies abstention because the state does not share the
content of the ICJ advisory opinion mentioned in the draft (ibid., p.6).
112See the note issued by the Secretary-General, ‘Use of mercenaries as a means of violat-
ing human rights and impending the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination’,
A/64/311, 20 August 2009.
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ties are criticised for endangering the self-determination of peoples and the
sovereignty of states and as such ostracised and sometimes outlawed. But
the current PMC’s are not prohibited as such and their activities in some
conflicts have been supported by countries like the USA and UK, which
have proceeded with an externalisation of certain tasks normally performed
by their national armies, something that raises the problem of control and
respect for Humanitarian Law. For the majority of UN members, there is an
urgent need to regulate PMC activities in order to prevent further violations
of self-determination, human rights, the unlawful trade in small arms and
the exploitation of natural resources113. Nonetheless, the EU members voted
against draft resolution A/C.3/64/L.57. Before the vote, the representative
of Sweden made a statement justifying the opposition of the EU members:
While concerned by the danger posed by mercenary activities that
had been mentioned in the report of the working group, particu-
larly with respect to the length and nature of armed conflicts, the
European Union believed that the matter did not fall within the
competence of either the Committee or the Human Rights Coun-
cil, and should not be considered from the point of view of human
rights violations or constraints on the exercise of the right of peo-
ples to self-determination. The European Union was determined
to pursue in other bodies the dialogue on the formulation of a
definition of mercenary activities and on the link between merce-
nary activities and terrorism, subjects which were included in the
remit of the Sixth Committee.114
The EU is sometimes criticised in its pretension to be a spokesman for
the ‘international community’. As the representative of Iran says, some
resolutions (especially those denouncing the situation of human rights in
countries such as Iran) are not supported by the international community,
but only by some Western diplomats who try to impose their own values and
who, most of the time, are not entitled to criticise other countries mainly
because the situation in their own countries can also be criticised. It’s the
‘double standard’ attitude that is in this case pinpointed115.
Conclusion
Human rights and democracy are probably the two topics about which the
EU is supposed to be most pro-active and influential116. The Swedish pres-
idency of the EU Council has fought hard to obtain a majority for its pro-
posals condemning North Korea and Myanmar for their poor records in this
113A/C.3/64/SR.37, p.3.
114A/C.3/64/SR.43, p.10.
115A/C.3/64/SR.40, p.12.
116See Karen Smith, op. cit.
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field. The battle was also tough for Canada regarding its draft resolution
concerning the situation of human rights in Iran. In the end, all of these
resolutions were adopted but only with a narrow majority, many countries
having chosen to abstain. This situation illustrates the enduring difficulty
for the EU to appear as a genuine proponent for universalising human rights.
The denunciation of double standards underpins many of the interventions.
The ‘North/South’ divide also appears in the debate relating to the
defamation of religions and the fight against racism, xenophobia and dis-
crimination. This debate continues to rage between those (mainly West-
ern Countries) who stand firm on the right to free expression117 and those
(mainly Southern and Muslim Countries) who think that this right must be
limited by the rules prohibiting the incitement to racist actions and feelings
of hatred and must be balanced by the respect due to religious beliefs. There
is nonetheless a difference between the US and the EU since the former is ea-
ger to recall that the US was founded on the principle of freedom of religion
while the latter stresses more the idea of respect, dialogue and tolerance118.
On a more general level, the EU stands firm against any attempt to politicise
the follow-up of the Durban Conference119. According to Kissack, the task of
the EU in terms of human rights advocacy is not an easy one: ‘While Africa
and Asia Group states are not inherently opposed to European initiatives,
the majority of the Global South belong to these regions and have a hu-
man rights agenda based on anti-imperialism, non-intervention and question
the universality and definition of human rights offered by the North’120. He
pinpoints the fact that coordination is time-consuming and thus not enough
time is devoted to coordination with other groups in order to convince and
influence them121.
Moreover, some topics are inherently divisive even for EU members. In-
deed there is no European consensus on the rights for indigenous peoples or
on prostitution. The EU is not really a leader when it comes to new ideas
and challenges in the field of human rights. After having analysed the EU’s
performance in the new Council for Human Rights, Kissack states: ‘Despite
its voting cohesion, it was the losing minority in 21 of the 24 regular session
votes, and its resolutions are becoming more conservative as the EU seeks
to work with other regional groups that make hefty demands in the final
text.’122
117The EU stands firm on the fact that it is also strongly committed to fostering dialogue
between religions and cultures, see A/61/PV.83, p.18.
118A/61/PV.83, p.18.
119A/61/PV.81, p.10.
120Robert Kissack, op.cit., p.47.
121Ibid., pp.47-48.
122Ibid., p.49. According to Karen Smith, the EU is less efficient that the African group
and the Arab group, notably on Palestine and religious freedom. The North/South divide
is still vivid and reinforced by the new composition of the Council, ibid., p.50.
26
The conclusion he draws is somehow paradoxical if judged with common
sense politics: a more united Europe does not per se guarantee more influence
at least in the field of human rights policies within the UN. In a way, his
analysis corroborates some of Karen Smith’s insights regarding the work of
the EU in the Council for Human Rights123:
• The number of propositions introduced in the name of the EU grows
but the items do not vary a lot and there are still divergences among the
EU members on Cuba or the Middle East. They concerned in the main
the death penalty, children’s rights, Iran, Iraq, Israeli settlements, etc.
The Europeans are, moreover, reluctant to raise certain issues such as
that of violence against women and of those surrounding sexual orien-
tation. Some draft resolutions are clearly linked to national interests
(like the ones presented by the UK about Zimbabwe) or European
commercial ones (look for instance, what happened with China in the
1990s). Relations with other groups are, moreover, not cordial at all.
As Andrew Caphlam argues, ‘because the EU represents an ideological
and powerful bloc, other blocs may have to redefine their identity and
ideology in counter position to the EU. There is division in the debate,
not despite EU consistency, but because of EU coherence.’124
• Even if almost all resolutions supported by the EU are finally adopted,
the tension between North and South is still present. Time consumed
for intra-European coordination prevents any further time being in-
vested in advocacy and persuasion. In the eyes of the EU’s partners,
the maintenance of its unity remains more important than the efficiency
of its policy. This also implies that time consuming tasks resulting in
intractable outcomes125. The ways in which the EU behaves will pre-
vent a leadership role in the HRC unless reform of its coordination
system is undertaken.
4 Discussions in the fourth committee (special po-
litical and decolonisation committee)
Many proposals and debates in this committee revolve around the Israeli -
Palestinian conflict. The EU is basically united on this topic and votes with
123Karen Smith, The European Union, Human Rights and the United Nations, pp.155
and ff. Strong pressure exists in the field of HR to produce a consensus across all EU
members. The very high number of meetings and their length prove the seriousness of
the work as envisaged by European diplomats insofar as K. Smith evokes in this field
the existence of consensus reflex more than a coordination one. Only 15 to 25% of the
endeavours rest on individual members, the rest have to be credited as EU initiatives,
p.156.
124Ibid., p.166.
125Paul Luif, op. cit., p.52.
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an overwhelming majority of states in favour of draft resolutions, which are
mainly proposed by other groups126. Resolutions calling for the implemen-
tation of the declaration on granting of independence to colonial countries
do not give rise to many interventions on behalf of the EU, most of the time,
its members abstain127.
There are nonetheless issues that trigger divergent votes, mainly those
dealing with colonial history and its legacies128. The UK and France still
however oppose requests issued by the special committee on decolonisation
regarding the situation in territories they consider non-autonomous, such
as the Falkland Islands129. But according to the UK representative, this is
a territory under the sovereignty of the Crown, a position with which Ar-
gentina disagrees130. The inhabitants are willing to stay under the authority
of the UK (like those living in Gibraltar), so the right to self-determination
is respected and the UK is behaving as a responsible tutor for all the territo-
ries still under its sovereignty. It has, for instance, encouraged them to meet
G-20 standards to ensure sound financial regulation and economic manage-
ment, particularly in Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman
Islands131.
That being said, the Europeans do not have a monopoly of being consid-
ered as colonial or administering powers and therefore are not stigmatised
as the only states challenging the universal implementation of the right to
self-determination. Discussions are also dedicated to the cases of Western
Sahara, ruled by Morocco132, to certain US possessions like Porto Rico, the
126See the critical position of the US regarding the unbalanced and biased resolutions
aiming at criticising the state of Israel, an opinion the EU seems to share but does not
dare to express.
127A/64/411; A/C.4/64/SR.7, pp.4-5. The representative of Sweden speaking on behalf
of the EU justified the abstention of the EU members on the grounds that specialised
agencies and international institutions associated with the UN must strictly comply with
their mandate, which are dedicated to the educational, humanitarian and technical fields.
128Paul Luif, op. cit., p.21.
129See the result of the recorded vote on ‘Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories
transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the United Nations’, France, UK abstained
with Israel and the USA, the rest of the members were in favour, A/C.4/64/SR.7, pp.2-3;
on ‘Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of Non-Self-
Governing Territories’, France and UK abstained, the other EU members voted in favour
of the draft resolution, ibid., p.3; ‘Dissemination of information on decolonisation’, UK
was against and France abstained, ibid., p.6. The UK representative justified the no-vote
by the fact that ‘the obligation imposed on the UN secretariat to publicise information
on decolonisation issues constituted an unwarranted drain on the Organisation’s scare
resources’; on ‘Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples’, France and Belgium abstained, UK intervened after the
vote and stated that the no-vote did not mean that UK was not committed to modernising
its relationship with its Overseas Territories, ibid., p.7.
130A/C.4/64/SR.6, p.14.
131A/C.4/64/SR.2, p.6 and p.9; A/C.4/64/SR.6, p.13.
132The Western Sahara problem has ignited a conflict between Morocco and Algeria, the
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American Virgin Islands and Guam, and to the situation of Tokelau ad-
ministrated by New Zealand. In addition we have Gibraltar, which is still
considered to be a non-self governing territory and is the object of dispute
between two EU members (UK and Spain)133. Differences over the status
of territories such as Jammu Kashmir saw opposing ‘Southern’ countries -
India and Pakistan - and thus the issue more generally cannot be perceived
as a traditional controversy between European colonisers and the ‘Global
South’134.
Against this backdrop, the EU is not really part of the picture135, and this
is perhaps good news for its legitimacy since the decolonisation process has
attracted a lot of attention from the international community and given rise
to a lot of criticism from the majority of UN members. But this optimistic
view could be somewhat more nuanced by the fact that national policies
from the EU countries can sometimes be attributed to ‘Europe’, not as an
institution but as a political bloc with a heavy legacy regarding colonisation
and its worst outcomes136. The discussion about the status of the Falklands
Islands launched by the representative of Uruguay on behalf of MERCOSUR
reveals a dispute with the European Community, which has included these
Islands in the list of territories covered by the EC Treaty, and by doing so,
has recognised the legal title of the UK137. As a consequence, the EU can be
viewed as a political entity or accomplice of the colonial powers.
The comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping opera-
tions was presented by the Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping oper-
ations, Mr Le Roy, and the Under-Secretary-General for field support, Ms
Malcora138. In this case, it is possible to identify more clearly the added
value of the external actions of the EU since the development of ESDP mis-
sions, notably in Africa where the crisis management policies of the EU are
intrinsically linked to UN undertakings. Thus it is no surprise that the first
intervention in the debate was made by the representative of Sweden on be-
half of the EU who underlined the importance of the dialogue with regional
organisations for improving cooperation with the UN and the overall effec-
tiveness of peacekeeping operations, as well as strengthening the synergies
between peacekeeping and peace-building139. His intervention also high-
former aims at achieving its territorial integrity whereas the latter actively supports the
self-determination of the Saharawi people, A/C.4/64/SR.6, p.12.
133A/C.4/64/SR.6, p.8.
134A/C.4/64/SR.6, p.14.
135There are nonetheless a few interventions on behalf of the EU, for example when the
representative of Sweden expresses the EU’s concerns over the security implications of the
Western Sahara dispute, A/C.4/64/SR.9, p.2.
136Pieter Lagrou, Europe in the world. Imperial legacies, in Mario Telo (ed.), The
European Union and Global Governance, London, Routledge, 2009, pp.308-328.
137A/C.4/64/SR.2, p.3.
138A/C.4/64/SR.15.
139A/C.4/64/SR.16, p.2.
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lights some concerns within the EU, mainly in respect of the empowerment
of women, the socio-economic impact of peacekeeping on local economies and
the labour market and the relationship between security and development.
The NAM’s judgement expressed through the intervention of the repre-
sentative of Morocco recalls the fundamental premises on which the peace-
keeping operations must be based: ‘All efforts and initiatives must be con-
ducted in conformity with the basic principles of peacekeeping, namely, con-
sent of the parties, non-use of force except in self-defence and impartiality.
The principles of sovereign equality, political independence and territorial
integrity of all states and non-intervention in matters that fall within their
domestic jurisdiction should be maintained.140’ This point was also raised
by the representative of Mexico on behalf of the Rio Group141, as well as by
the representative of Thailand speaking on behalf of ASEAN142. In a way,
the reminder of the primary role of the UN in the maintenance of peace and
security and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in all op-
erational matters illustrates the importance of respecting the UN Charter,
in particular the provisions dealing with the use of force in international re-
lations143. The comparison with the EU intervention is interesting insofar
as it sheds a light on the enduring divide between countries able to intervene
and countries potentially targeted by interventions, even though the vast
majority of peacekeeping troops are now provided by non-Western countries
operating under a Security Council mandate144. It is therefore obvious that
the question of sovereignty is still very sensitive, something the EU seems to
ignore while stressing the necessity of implementing international norms and
standards for the sake of the civil population, and especially for vulnerable
people145. While the Europeans continue to support the UN as the main
body responsible for maintaining international peace and security, some pre-
fer to view this as contingent particularly in respect of the fact that the EU
supported NATO bombing of the Federal republic in Yugoslavia for the ‘sake
of Humanity’146.
140A/C.4/64/SR.16, p.3.
141A/C.4/64/SR.16, p.4.
142A/C.4/64/SR.16, p.5.
143A/C.4/64/SR.16, p.6; the special responsibility of the UN is also recalled for criticising
unilateral military actions, A/C.4/64/SR.18, p.7 (Malaysia) and p.9 (Côte d’Ivoire).
144This peculiar situation can explain their grievances regarding the reimbursement of
troop-contributing countries and the payment of compensation in case of death or dis-
ability of their peacekeepers, A/C.4/64/SR.16, p.3. According to the representative of
Mexico, speaking in the name of the Rio Group, 87% of military and police personnel
deployed in peacekeeping operations are provided by developing countries.
145Compare for instance the intervention of Canada (for CANZ) and that of Brazil,
A/C.4/64/SR.17, p.3. As underlined by the representative of Sri Lanka, ‘robust peace-
keeping should not be taken to mean peace enforcement. Civilian protection mandates,
where applicable had to be carried out without prejudice to the primary responsibility of
the host country to protect its own civilians’, ibid., p.5; A/C.4/64/SR.19, p.3 (Bolivia).
146Olivier CORTEN, The Law Against War. The Prohibition on the Use of Force in
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While many countries evoke concrete political problems addressed by
those missions147, the language used by the EU is not concrete (except on
its own mission in Chad), neither truly political148 nor critical149. But it is
difficult to say whether this is the result of a thoughtful strategy or simply
inherent to the anti-foreign policy trend described by David Chandler150.
The EU seems to be more at the forefront concerning mine action and
international and regional responses to unregulated transfers of conventional
weapons, even if the other representatives do not actually refer to it when
they intervene, neither the observer of the International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent societies, not the Assistant Secretary-General for
Rule of Law and Security Institutions, DPKO151.
Once again, the EU does not appear as a prominent actor in this field.
The Russian representative mentions the EU as one among other regional
organisations to cooperate with the UN152 and the representative from Sin-
gapore is convinced that the EU and NATO have to bring their expertise
and resources to assist emerging troop contributors153. By the same token,
some countries also express their concern regarding the empowerment of re-
gional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security
recalling the necessity for those organisations ‘to remain fully on the aegis
of the Security Council’154.
Concerning the situation in the Middle East, the Commissioner-General
for UNRWA (United Nations Relief andWorks Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East) has issued a warning about the shortfalls of its mission
which lacks the funds to pay salaries, while the Palestinian people have
suffered tremendously from the Israeli military operation in Gaza155. She
nonetheless underlined the generosity of the Agency’s largest traditional
donors: the USA and the EU. The Observer for Palestine fiercely denounced
Contemporary International Law, Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2010, pp.537-
549. See in particular the criticism issued by various states, the Rio Group and the NAM
within the GA, pp.358-359.
147See for instance, Syria, A/C.4/64/SR.16, p.8; Sudan, ibid., p.9; Israel, ibid., p.11.
148Compare with the intervention of the representative of the USA, A/C.4/64/SR.18,
p.6.
149Compare with the intervention of the representative of India who stated that ‘the
main challenge facing peacekeeping was the nature of the Security Council mandates:
they were too broad and ambitious and bore little relation to the Organisation’s ability to
deliver. Peacekeeping operations must have clearer, achievable mandates; that would not
be possible without substantively, involving countries which contributed manpower and
resources to peacekeeping operations’, A/C.4/64/SR.19, p.2.
150David Chandler, The security-development nexus and the rise of ‘anti-foreign policy’,
Journal of International Relations and Development, 10(4), 2007, pp.362-386.
151A/C.4/64/SR.19, p.5 and ff.
152A/C.4/64/SR.17, p.10.
153A/C.4/64/SR.18, p.4 and p.11.
154See the intervention of the representative from Serbia, A/C.4/64/SR.18, p.14.
155A/C.4/64/SR.21, p.2.
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the military attacks against UNRWA premises, and other unlawful acts com-
mitted by Israel and asked the member States to hold Israel accountable156.
Taking the floor afterwards, the representative of Sweden, speaking on be-
half of the EU reminded those in attendance that the EU and its member
states is indeed the largest contributor to UNRWA. According to him, ‘re-
spect for international law, including humanitarian law and human rights
law, had guided the European Union’s policy not only with respect to the
conflict between Israel and its neighbours but also regarding support for UN-
RWA.157’ This leads to a vague condemnation of Israeli attacks and blockade
of the Gaza Strip because of the their humanitarian consequences but noth-
ing about compensation whereas the other interventions are much tougher
evoking for instance crimes against humanity and war crimes, using legal
terms to condemn Israeli policy towards Palestinians and vis-à-vis UN agen-
cies and referring to the specific legal instruments Israel must abide by158.
The discussion surrounding the report of the Special Committee to inves-
tigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people
and other Arabs of the occupied territories159 has enabled the EU to deliver
a critical statement on the continued settlement activities, house demoli-
tions and evictions in the occupied West Bank and the development in East
Jerusalem. For the spokesman of the EU presidency, all these acts remain
serious concerns since they run against international law, relevant Security
Council resolutions, the letter and the spirit of the Madrid conference and
the Quartet Road Map160. Therefore, the EU asks Israel to end settlement
activities immediately and to dismantle the outposts erected since 2001. It
recalls that it did not recognise any change of borders and asks for the dis-
mantling of the separation barrier when it does not correspond to the 1949
Armistice demarcation. This time the message is clearer and more attuned
to the majority in the committee161 as testified by the results of the vote162.
156A/C.4/64/SR.21, p.6. The Commissioner-General had just mentioned before that the
Israeli-mission in New York was discussing compensation with the office of legal affairs,
ibid., p.4.
157A/C.4/64/SR.21, p.6.
158See for example, A/C.4/64/SR.21, pp.8 and ff.; A/C.4/64/SR.22, p.3 and p.7
159A/C.4/64/SR.23.
160A/C.4/64/SR.23, p.5.
161Still there is no reference to the Goldstone report.
162A/C.4/64/SR.25, p.3 (assistance to Palestine refugees), p.4 (Persons displaced as a
result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities), p.4 (Operations of the United Nations
Relief and Works agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East), p.5 (Palestine refugees
properties and their revenues), p.8 (Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to
the protection of civilian persons in time of war, of the 12 August 1949, to the occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and other occupied Arab territories),
p.9 (Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem), p.9 (the occupied Syrian Golan). The EU
countries have nonetheless abstained on the draft on the ‘Work of the Special Committee
to Investigate Israeli Practices affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian people and
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Nonetheless, as regards the Syrian Golan, the EU shows is willingness to
balance respect for international rules and the political and diplomatic pro-
cesses ongoing in the region: ‘It should be recalled that, earlier this month,
the European Union voted in favour of the resolution on the Syrian Golan in
the Fourth Committee, which called upon Israel to desist from changing the
demographic composition of the occupied Syrian Golan and, in particular,
to desist from the establishment of settlements. We believe that the reso-
lution on the Syrian Golan under today’s agenda item contains references
that could undermine the process of bilateral negotiations. For that reason,
as in previous years, the European Union abstained in the voting on that
resolution.163’ The Delegate for Palestine also expresses his gratitude to the
EU164.
Conclusion
The EU seems here to be caught on the horns of a dilemma. As a regional
organisation committed to the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity its endeavours seem to be welcome, but at the very same time, and
despite its renewed commitment to international law and respect for the
main responsibility of the Security Council regarding the use of force, some
UN members remain suspicious and still fear that the development of EU
capabilities in peacemaking and peace-building amount to more interference
in the domestic affairs of third countries. Thus the reinforcement of regional
organisations is both viewed as a power multiplier of the UN capacity and a
threat to multilateral crisis management.
This ambivalent image of the EU can also be pinpointed in the field of
decolonisation. The EU as such is not directly targeted in the same way as
the former colonial states the behaviour of whom are not consistent with the
principle of self-determination. The EU is eager to show that it is both a
payer and a player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Therefore, it appears
to be, more or less, on the same side as the vast majority of UN members.
Suspicion is thus more clearly directed towards individual countries such as
France and the UK in this respect.
other Arabs of the Occupied Territories’, Ms Mawe explained that the term ‘collective
punishment’ has a specific meaning under humanitarian law but apparently, all the EU
members did not agree to use it in the current context and added: ‘While recognising
Israel’s right to self-defence, the European Union called on that country to exercise the
utmost restraint and to refrain from any action that was disproportionate or breached
international humanitarian and human rights law. The EU condemned violence against
Palestinian civilians, as well as the firing rockets into Israel, and called for a complete and
sustained halt to such acts of violence and terrorism.’ With such a concern, the EU is
closer to the opinions expressed by New Zealand and Canada which constantly refuse to
single out one country (Israel).
163A/60/PV.60, p.7. Position adopted by the representative of the UK speaking on
behalf of the EU. See also GA/10428, 01/12/2005; A/61/PV.63, p.7.
164A/60/PV.60, p.8.
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In this committee, the EU seem to benefit from being a political entity
distinct from its member states but as far as important principles are at
stake like the rules governing the use of force and respect for sovereignty as
concerned, it is not clear that third countries are that confident with the
self-proclaimed image of the EU being a normative power or at least a power
willing to expand the rule of law in international relations. Paul Luif has
already pinpointed the fact that the political ideas or principles supported
by the EU in New York are also interpreted by third countries in regards
to words and deeds uttered in other forums or circumstances. ‘ [. . . ] The
independent role of the EU [on Middle East Questions] vis-à-vis the United
States was not reflected in the ‘real world’ outside the United Nations’165.
Thus, what can be seen as a distinct position within the GA through the
analysis of positions adopted by the EU members does not always lead to a
perception that would only stem from the EU discourse at the UN insofar as
it can be infused by exogenous elements. Previous analysis related to the way
the EU is perceived in the Middle East clearly shows some disappointment
regarding its position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict166.
5 Resolutions stemming from sixth committee (le-
gal issues)
The debate about ‘Measures to eliminate international terrorism’ reveals a
broad consensus on the need to eradicate terrorism and a straightforward
condemnation of the violence it provokes by underlying that it cannot be
justified on any grounds. This is without doubt a problem that every coun-
try or group of countries is committed to tackle with all means available.
Nonetheless, it is also obvious that not all groups or countries share the
same concerns, priorities and agendas.
CANZ (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) support the UN global counter-
terrorism strategy and mainly focus on South-East Asia where the national
programme of assistance and resources are concerned167. In most of the
interventions of other representatives, there is a much clearer commitment
to recognising the leading role of the UN in this field168. The slight difference
in wording could be explained by the position taken during the Iraqi war.
The NAM, the African Group, the OIC members and CARICOM recall
that some issues remain unresolved. The lack of a universally acceptable
legal definition of terrorism for example epitomises the difference between
Western countries and the rest of the world. By reading the interventions,
165Paul Luif, op. cit., p.22.
166Simona Santoro and Rami Nasrallah, Conflict and hope: the EU in the eyes of Pales-
tine, in S. Lucarelli and L. Fioramondi (eds), op.cit.
167A/C.6/64/SR.2, pp.2-3.
168A/C.6/64/SR.2, see Vietnam, p.3, Mexico, p.4, Russia, p.10.
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it is quite clear that this absence can be explained by the enduring will of
some states to distinguish acts of terrorism and the legitimate struggle of
peoples under foreign occupation or colonial or alien domination to exercise
their right to self-determination169. Even if it is not explicitly stated, it is
quite clear that the process of decolonisation and the current situation in
Palestine explain this concern. Probably also linked to the previous issue,
these countries seem to consider that terrorism can also be attributed to
states and not only to private groups170.
Some doubts have also surfaced over the lack of transparency in the
implementation of resolutions 1373 and 1540171; they relate mainly to the
work of the sanctions committees in charge of listing terrorist groups and
individuals that could be targeted. There is a tendency in poorer countries to
evoke the root causes of terrorism as political and economic injustice, denial
of the right to self-determination etc., but without justifying the violence
and to repeat that terrorism cannot be associated with any race, religion,
culture or group, something that can sound like criticism of some Western
countries policies, particularly when the non-judicial use of force has been
contemplated to fight terrorism172.
Speaking in the name of the EU, the representative of Sweden delivered
a speech that could be considered as original in comparison with the CANZ
and the other groups. Indeed, while not addressing the issue of the definition
of terrorism, something he knows is intractable at this point173, and men-
tioning the UN alongside with other international organisations like NATO
and OSCE, Mr Lundkvist welcomed recent steps in improving procedures for
the imposition of sanctions, acknowledging to an extent the problems asso-
ciated with the previous ones, while renewing the EU’s efforts to strengthen
the dialogue between cultures. He also stressed the necessity to comply with
international law, humanitarian law and refugee law in combating terrorist
activities174.
The split in the EU over the request for an advisory opinion of the In-
ternational Court of Justice on whether the unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence of Kosovo is in accordance with international law raises important
questions about fundamental principles in international relations (what is a
state, what is sovereignty, who benefits from self-determination) and shows
that the EU has not yet achieved unity twenty years after the break-up of Yu-
169A/C.6/64/SR.2, pp.4-6.
170A/C.6/64/SR.2, pp.5-6.
171A/C.6/64/SR.2, pp.4-5.
172A/C.6/64/SR.2, pp.5-6. According to the representative of Uzbekistan, the situation
in Afghanistan proves that the problem could not be resolved by armed force alone, ibid.,
p.8.
173This is clearly something about which the EU and the Arab states disagree in their
common efforts to combat terrorism in the framework of the Mediterranean dialogue.
174A/C.6/64/SR.2, p.7.
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goslavia which implied debates on such fundamental norms175. The silence
of the EU in the debate concerning the clash between self-determination and
territorial integrity in the case of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbai-
jan is perhaps telling here176.
Conclusion
Discussions on legal matters can also be very interesting as far as they are
also imbued by various political views encompassing important principles
governing international relations. On one major discussion, focusing on the
fight against terrorism, the EU is united and keeps a peculiar profile by
stressing the importance of abiding by the law and insuring more trans-
parency in sanctions policy. To that extent, the dialogue with other groups
remains open. On the other hand, as regards the issues of self-determination
and territorial integrity, it is clear that the EU cannot even maintain a con-
sistent position among its own members, with domestic level political issues
playing a major role here.
General conclusions
The data that has served as the raw material for our analysis must be manip-
ulated with great caution. As noted previously, the link between a political
idea and a perception cannot easily be established. External perceptions of
the EU at the UN do not only arise from positions taken in this forum by
its members States, they are also based on subjective feelings, ideological
preferences, past experiences, interactions within other international organi-
sations, and bilateral relations. Nonetheless, the thorough readings of thou-
sands pages of summary records, votes and resolutions can bring forward
some interesting insights enabling us to get a more comprehensive view of
the world scene. The role played by the EU at this stage obviously does
not depend only on the authority, resources and capabilities devoted to its
external relations but also on the store of common ideas, norms and values
it imbues and promotes. At this normative level, the large number of res-
olutions adopted without resorting to a vote is illustrative of the existence
of global norms and ideas (even if they are not always interpreted in the
same manner or for the same purposes) that represent the ideological glue
necessary for the existence and the functioning of the UN. The mere fact
that the GA has no real compulsory power is not a relevant explanation for
understanding the existence of a large consensus on global threats or on the
necessity to fight poverty for example. It appears clearly that some ideas
remains divisive, new controversies arise and if the GA was that inefficient
175GA/10764, 8 October 2008.
176A/C.3/64/SR.37, pp.12-14.
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and its resolutions void of substance there would be no debates at all in this
forum. As such, ideas do matter, and the end of the bipolar world has not led
to the end of controversies and differences between states and groups within
the GA, even if this event has undoubtedly contributed to the blurring of
the readability of political projects177. Against this backdrop, the ambition
of the EU was supposed to lean on substantial and procedural moves: by
fostering dialogue and cooperation within the EU and multilateralism at the
global level, the EU was willing to gain more influence at the international
stage in order to sustain the universalisation of the values underpinning its
political project and the spread of fundamental ideas sustaining its politi-
cal integration. This twofold ambition has been partially thwarted. On the
one hand, the influence of the EU at the UN is at best uneven and depen-
dent on the issues at stake. The mere fact of ‘speaking with one voice’ in
more matters does not lead automatically to more influence as far as ideas
are concerned. Reflections on the role of the EU can grasp the difficulties
encountered in achieving influence and spreading the ideas stemming from
its own political project. On the other hand, it seems that the importance
of ‘speaking with one voice’ and the mechanisms put it place in order to
guarantee more unity have been detrimental to the EU’s overall level of in-
fluence. The substance of the messages delivered in the name of the EU is
often too introspective and lacking in clarity from a political point of view.
Thus, ‘speaking with one voice’ sometimes appears to be little more than a
default or performative strategy178.
The EU role within the UN: bridge-builder or leader?
For Kissack, the issue of leadership within the UN system can be understood
in different ways179. The first is structural leadership, which lies in the ca-
pacity to influence or determine outputs according to one’s own preferences
and interests. The EU, the USA and the G77 can all, in certain circum-
stances, be leaders in this sense. During the 64th session, it is difficult to
find a clear example of a controversy where the EU imposed its own view
apart from the resolutions condemning countries like Iran, Myanmar or the
DPRK for their violations of basic human rights (but each were passed with
very thin majorities). In the field of disarmament, the EU seems to be at the
forefront in respect of certain specific topics but at the same time is accused
of bypassing the UN and so of betraying the very spirit of multilateralism it
177What is striking in a way is the fact that general voting trends have slightly changed
since the end of the Cold War, with clear shifts of behaviour in some specific cases, but
also with the continuity of what could be described as a ‘Global North’, distinct from
the rest of the world. See the tables provided by Paul Luif, op. cit., pp.39-48 and the
conclusions p.51.
178See Macaj Gjovalin dissertation.
179As for intellectual leadership, this remains the exclusive prerogative of the staff of the
institution
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is supposed to stand for. As Paul Luif has already noted, the behaviour of
the EU states is mostly reactive180.
Entrepreneurial power is traditionally attached to the commitments of
middle powers favouring the smooth functioning or improvement of the UN
system. But as already demonstrated by Laatikainen181, the EU is too pow-
erful and ambitious to play this role. For Kissack, the EU could have played
the role of ‘bridge builder’ by being seen as an alternative to the US power.
But the problem is that:
From the perspective of much of the developing world, the EU is
not that much more of an attractive partner than the US. Both
share worldviews based on western liberal philosophy and liberal
capitalist economics182. Both put primary emphasis on the indi-
vidual as the focal point of the international human rights regime,
as opposed to family, community or religious group. Where the
two differ is in the way the third parties perceive them. The US is
seen as straight-talking and predictable in pursuit of its own inter-
ests which are clearly articulated making negotiations tough but
honest. The EU, by contrast, has a reputation for being more dif-
ficult to negotiate with owing to its opaque international decision
making and the mixed messages coming from different member
states. Moreover, it is distrusted by some states because of the
way it proclaims to seek universal goals but is (in the eyes of third
parties) simply pursuing its own policy objectives183.
At such it remains somewhat problematic for the EU to be recognised as
the main vehicle of universal values. As Holsag argues, although ‘political
exchanges between the European Union and the major emerging countries
have been proliferating, communication, coordination and cooperation have
become more institutionalised by means of cooperation agreements or ac-
tion plans, specific agreements, summit meetings and sectoral dialogues’184,
progress has essentially occurred in economic areas. The EU has simply not
reached consensus with the emerging markets on the priorities and channels
for cooperation in the field of international political and security issues.
180Paul Luif, op. cit., p.16. See also Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, op.
cit., p.17.
181Katie Verlin Laatikainen, Pushing Soft Power: Middle Power Diplomacy at the UN,
in K. Verlin Laatikainen and K. Smith (eds), op. cit., pp.86 and ff.
182According the author, it is true that the EU members are often on the same line in
the Security Council, but it is not actually the case in other fora, where the EU tends to
be depicted as a ‘benign hegemon’, striving for a more human centred capitalism, aware
of the necessity to ‘green’ politics and to express more solidarity with the ‘Global South’,
pp.175 et ff.
183Robert Kissack, op. cit., pp.143-144.
184J. Holsag, op. cit., p.7.
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By comparing the European votes at the GA with the BRICs185 votes
from 2001 to 2008, Hoslag sheds a light of what he calls a ‘normative dis-
connect’:
First, there has been a divergence in the formulation of norms
and rules in regard to the issues discussed in the UNGA. Sec-
ond, cooperation between the EU and the BRICS has remained
negligible compared to that between the members of the BRICS
quintet. While Europe has been the inspiration behind modern
regional cooperation and integration most new instances of re-
gionalisation are found elsewhere. [. . . ] In many ways, the kind of
regional cooperation that is backed by the BRICS serves the pro-
tection of sovereignty rather than its pooling through integration.
Growing economic integration notwithstanding, non-interference
and state-centric economic development have remained promi-
nent principles. [. . . ] A recent phenomenon here is the pursuit
of unilateral multilateralism. The BRICS increasingly form
their own sub-regional organisations. This form of competitive
regionalisation allows them to project their influence more effec-
tively that their rivals, while the smaller members hope to reap
greater benefits. [. . . ] The emphasis on safeguarding sovereignty,
non-interference and respect for ‘independent choices of develop-
ment paths in line with the national conditions’ runs as a red
line throughout recent joint declarations. Russia is setting the
same tone in its Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)
or the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC). What the Euro-
pean Union has thus failed to recognise is that enmeshing these
giants in a multilateral framework will not automatically lead to
cooperation, coordination or normative convergence. The reality
is that the BRICS countries are enmeshing a larger number of
small countries in their own multilateral networks for the sake
of their own interests. Competitive multilateralism has led to
normative incongruence and reverse socialisation.186’
Creed concludes that the normative power of the EU is very modest.
There are very few situations where the EU could be considered to have
been a leader, to put it bluntly: ‘The EU is not recognised as a capable
stakeholder in the final decision making’187.’
185The BRICs became the BRICS in April 2011 when South Africa of-
ficially joined Brazil, Russia, India and China in the organisation. See,
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/0414/South-Africa-
joins-the-BRICS-club-calls-for-reform-of-UN.
186Ibid., p.8.
187Ibid., p.15.
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Bureaucracy without Politics?
By examining the debates within the various GA Committees, it is clear that
the EU is capable of defending particular ideas on trade and development,
the defamation of religions, the death penalty, and sustainable development.
Third countries have also identified some features that could epitomise the
European identity at the international level from a theoretical point of view.
But some countries however seem to be somewhat perplexed by the EU’s vot-
ing abstentions interpreting them as the result of basic divisions between its
members over and above the actual content of the resolution in question188.
Even if the data does not support the statement made by the representa-
tive of Mexico according to whom ‘abstention has become the trademark of
the EU’189, it is nonetheless a perception worth pinpointing for our anal-
ysis insofar as we know that perceptions do not reflect objective realities
but nevertheless remain of the utmost importance in understanding political
interactions, decisions, and the recognition of the EU as a global actor. In
this case, the enlargement process is seen as an ‘abstention multiplier’ caus-
ing the dilution of the political message sent by the EU. This impression is
shared by Mexico, South Africa and the US alike190.
This trend towards ‘de-politicisation’ could also be analysed in conjunc-
tion with the bureaucratic approach that appears to be the trademark of
the EU. For countries like the US, it is crucial to maintain bilateral contacts
with individual member states, something the procedure for coordination
does not acknowledge, mainly because all the representatives holding the
rotating presidency do not share the same views on the issue of the transat-
lantic relationship. The fear is to have a more permanent structure at the
UN (with a mainly secretariat function) that will further rigidify the EU’s
positions at the UN191.
Some diplomats from other groups who also deplore the lack of flexibility
tend to view the EU as fundamentally euro-centric. For instance, they be-
moan the fact that when it comes up with a common position it sometimes
gives the impression that then the negotiation is over because its member
188Fiona Creed, op. cit., p.12.
189Fiona Creed, op. cit., p.12.
190Fiona Creed, op. cit., p.15 and p.17.
191Fiona Creed, op. cit., p.15. The Lisbon Treaty provisions regarding the external
representation of the EU do not actually bring revolutionary changes since there is no
one single representation for the EU. Representation functions are still held by many
people: the High representative for foreign affairs and security policy, the head of the
EU delegation (Commission) and the permanent representative of the European Coun-
cil. In principle the representative of the state holding the rotating presidency is no
longer empowered to speak on behalf of the EU. But it seems that, contrary to what
was envisaged in Brussels, this is not actually the case. See, http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_9389_en.htm. However, it is still far from clear how the pow-
ers of the High Representative, the European Council President and the President of the
European Commission will be balanced.
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have reached a consensus192. Diplomats representing groups like the G77 are
then forced to remind the EU representative that they are more numerous
and so far more representative of the ‘international community’.
The reluctance to see the EU becoming a sort of primus inter pares is
discernible in the discussion having followed the failed attempt of Catherine
Ashton to speak on behalf of the EU at the UN without being formally a
full member of the organisation. After the entry into force of the Lisbon
Treaty, the issue of the Union’s speaking rights was raised after a diplomatic
incident. Although the EU is the biggest donor in flood-devastated Pakistan,
Catherine Ashton was prevented from taking the floor at a special UN meet-
ing on aid to the country193. However, after the vote of a recent resolution
on the 4th of May 2010, the EU has finally gained the right to be a speaker at
the UN (180 countries voted in favour, Syria and Zimbabwe abstained, while
10 countries did not take part to the vote). Catherine Ashton and Herman
Van Rompuy will be then able to present common EU positions to the UN.
The EU is granted with a ‘super-observer status’.
It should be reminded that the EU had hitherto only observer status
at the UN. With the election of a permanent Council president and High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU’s position at
the UN appeared to require some procedural type upgrading. EU members
France and the UK, who are eager to defend their special prerogatives in the
UN Security Council, were initially reluctant to accept the idea. They have
finally agreed to a compromise under which the head of EU diplomacy will
have the right to speak on the EU’s behalf in the GA but not in the Security
Council. But the EU’s recent upgrade at the UN is also compelling other
organisations, such as the Arab League, the African Union and ASEAN, to
seek equal status. It is still unclear what response these organisations will
receive, as the UN previously appeared unwilling to open a Pandora’s box
of new speaking rights194. Such an endeavour aiming at fostering the role of
the EU within the UN did not initially seem welcome by the other groups.
At the end, one could wonder whether the EU is different from other groups
in the GA195?
The complaint frequently heard about the EU is that it is ‘too process-
driven’ and thus often delivers a ‘message devoid of substance’. In reality
it is not even clear that true collective policy-making even exists196, ‘they
have been unable to devise a clear grand strategy informing what range
192Fiona Creed, op. cit., p.11.
193http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/ashton-obtain-speaking-rights-un-news-
497162
194http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/ashton-obtain-speaking-rights-un-news-
497162
195Laurent Beauguitte, European Union Cohesiveness at the UNGA: A comparative and
critical approach, Paper presented at the 5th ECPR General Conference, Potsdam, 2010.
196Paul Luif, 197, p.52.
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of capabilities would be necessary to give the EU the greatest power and
influence within international relations. Such a preference for procedure, as
a substitute for policy substance, has been a long-term characteristic of EU
foreign policymaking.’198
198Richard Whitman, op.cit., p.25.
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